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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
cision was by a bare majority of the court while the Jones opinion was
based upon the precedent of the former. As the court in the principal case
clearly shows the Selleck case was decided upon statutes which were repealed
by the legislature in 1919. These statutes, R. S. Mo. (1909) sees. 956-960,
provided that the court should have power only to suspend an accused from
practice until the facts were ascertained in the criminal trial; the record of
conviction or acquittal should be conclusive of the facts. The majority in the
Selleck case interpreted these provisions to mean that an acquittal compelled
the court to dismiss the disbarment proceedings. In 1919 what is now
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 11712, was enacted to replace the "excuse for this judicial
aberration." It provides, "If the attorney be acquitted or discharged upon
his trial . . . the Court shall forthwith hear the evidence offeied in sup-
port of said charge and the evidence offered by the accused, and shall de-
termine the matter without delay."
The Richards decision, even had the 1909 statutes been in effect, would
have been the same for the court says, "any statutory enactment under-
taking to make an acquittal in a criminal prosecution a bar to such an in-
vestigation would be, as heretofore suggested, an unconstitutional en-
croachment of the legislative upon the judicial department of government.
. . . it certainly does not follow that after acquittal thereon these same
acts may not be charged and proved as reasons for disbarment if they in
fact show that respondent is unfit to continue in the practice of the law."
Generally the statutory grounds of disbarment are not exclusive and in those
states where the legislature has attempted to specify causes for disbarment
it is the rule that the courts may suspend or remove for other causes than
those mentioned in the statute. 2 Thornton, Attorneys at Law, 759 and cases
cited.
This declaration of the Supreme Court of Missouri that it has inherent
power to disbar any attorney, regardless of statute, for any conduct that
renders him unfit for the proper performance of his duties as an officer of
court is a great step forward. It is at least a healthy tendency toward the
development of the bar on a higher ethical plane. S. M., '34.
BANKS AND BANKING-DEPOSIT OF CHECK INDORSED IN BLANK-EFECT OF
INSOLVENCY OF COLLECTING BANK.-A bank accepted for deposit from the
payee, giving immediate credit therefor, a check drawn by a loan association
on another bank, and indorsed by payee in blank. The first bank subse-
quently failed to open for business, and depositor instructed the loan associa-
tion to stop payment on the check. The bank now sues to recover the amount
thereof. Held: Reversing the decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals
(1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 608, for the loan association, on the ground that the
Bank Collection Code made the bank only an agent of the depositor, who
could therefore at any time revoke the agency, stop payment on the check,
and himself collect directly from the other bank. Farmers Exchange Bank
of Marshfield v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Assn. of Missouri (Mo., 1933)
61 S. W. (2d) 717.
The common law rule according to "the great weight of authority sup-
ports the proposition that when a customer presents a check or draft to the
bank for deposit, non-restrictively indorsed, and the bank gives him credit
therefor, prima facie, the bank becomes the owner of the instrument and the
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debtor of the depositor for the amount credited." Townsend, Bank Deposits
of Commercial Paper (1929) 7 N. Y. U. Law Rev. 293, 1. c. 312; 3 R. C. L. 152.
This was clearly the rule in Missouri prior to the adoption of this Code.
Ayres v. Farmers and Merchants Bank (1883) 79 Mo. 421; Mudd v. Farmers
and Merchants Bank of Hunnewell (1913) 175 Mo. App. 398; 162 S. W. 314.
This is the first reported case involving Section 2 of the new Uniform Bank
Collection Code (R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5567.) The pertinent words of this
section are as follows: "Except as otherwise provided by agreement . . .
where an item is deposited or received for collection, the bank of deposit shall
be agent of the depositor for its collection. . . 2 This apparently operates
as a direct change from the common law rule and the Code was so interpreted
in the principal case.
But the construction of this section has not been uniform. The Court of
Appeals in refusing to accept this change in the law, held that the very
circumstances under which this deposit was made were facts sufficient to
constitute such an implied agreement ta the contrary, to which the section
refers, and thus establish the relationship of debtor and creditor, as at com-
mon law. The Supreme Court, however, in reversing this decision, held
that they could not "give effect to an implied agreement of the sale of the
check to the bank, implied, if at all, from the very facts which the statute
says shall not change the agency relation."
In Lawton v. Lower Main St. Bank (S. C., 1933) 170 S. E. 469, subse-
quently decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the Court, without
referring to the Missouri case, held that Section 2 of the Code applies to an
item which "is deposited for collection or is received for collection," and
consequently does not apply to ordinary deposits. This, however, seems to
be a construction, which although a logical enough deduction from the
language employed by the act, reaches a conclusion contrary to the apparent
intent of the draftsman both as expressed by the statute and in his notes
thereto. To avoid this confusion and possible misinterpretation, the statute
should be amended to make the relation between bank and depositor one of
agency where "an item is received for collection or is deposited." Townsend,
The Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers' Association (1933) 8 Tu-
lane L. Rev. 21, 1. c. 27, f. n. 11.
This Code, passed early in 1929, was sponsored by the American Bankers'
Association, and since, in most cases, it is to the advantage of the bank to
be considered an agent rather than a purchaser, it would seem that the Mis-
souri Supreme Court has reached a correct interpretation of the act. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was of the
opinion "That the Code drafted by the Counsel for the American Bankers'
Ass'n was not adequate, and that an act should be drafted for submission to
this Conference and when approved, recommended for adoption by the
several states." Handbook of the Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on Unif. State Laws
(1929) p. 250. This act, not yet approved by the Commission, is now in the
form of a third tentative draft. Handbook of the Nat'l Conf. of Comm. on
Unif. State Laws (1931) p. 256. This proposed act expressly repudiates
the doctrine expressed in Section 2 of the Bank Collection Code, and chooses
to abide by the common law rule which states the overwhelming weight of
authority in this country and England, that the bank, in ordinary cases of
deposit of checks, is a purchaser of the check.
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Standing in the way, however, of the success of the Uniform Commission-
ers in their efforts to preserve this established common law doctrine is the
fact that the present Bank Collection Code has already been adopted by 18
states, and it is not likely that these states will readily consent to another
such radical change in their banking laws. So looking to the future, and
assuming the completion of the Uniform Act now pending, it seems likely
that the American states will again be divided into two groups on this ques-
tion, such as they were when the present common law rule was being de-
veloped. Those having adopted the Bank Collection Code sponsored by the
American Bankers Ass'n will no doubt follow the principal Missouri case
and recognize the agency relationship; and those which choose to adopt the
act proposed by the members of the Uniform State Laws Commission, along
with those which do not adopt either code, will retain the present common
law view, which treats the bank as a purchaser of the paper. Thus these
attempts at uniformity will probably not only result in a failure of their
ultimate purpose, but will on the contrary create an even greater conflict
than existed prior to the enactment of this legislation. I. J. W., '35.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EMINENT DOMAIN-GOLD REQUISITIONING-The
recovery legislation gradually begins to reap a judicial harvest. A
recent case continues the already notable tendency to furnish old legal im-
plements in support of the present labor. On an indictment in two counts
for failure to comply with executive order of August 28, 1933, demanding
returns to be made regarding gold held in possession, and that of April 5,
1933, requisitioning such supplies, held, the first order is a valid exercise of
the currency powers of the national government. The requisitioning order
was pronounced invalid because promulgated by the President and not by the
Secretary of the Treasury, as provided by the statute. The court, however,
seized the opportunity to elaborate a lengthy dictum justifying the requisi-
tion on the basis of eminent domain. United States v. Campbell (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1933) 5 Fed. Supp. 156.
The power of Congress to regulate gold is a corollary of its generously
defined currency control. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, clauses 2, 5, 18: Veazie Bank
v. Fenno (1869) 8 Wall. 533; Legal Tender Cases (1870) 12 Wall. 457;
Juilliard v. Greenman (1884) 110 U. S. 421. In a somewhat analogous case
the Phillipine legislature, acting under authority delegated by Congress, was
held validly to have prohibited the export of Phillipine silver coin. Ling Su
Fan v. United States (1910) 218 U. S. 302.
In applying the doctrine of eminent domain to the requisitioning of gold
certain superficial difficulties are entailed. In time of war the sphere Of
governmental requisition is practically unlimited. The Lever Act for Food
Control (1917)40 Stat. 276. The court in the instant case, however, bases
its justification rather on the essential nature of eminent domain than on any
attempted analogy between the present predicament and a state of war.
The cases are permeated with dicta extending the rule to all forms of property
whether personal or real. United States v. Lynah (1903) 188 U. S. 445, at
p. 465. Actually, however, the occasions on which property other than real
has been appropriated are relatively few; although, when such have pre-
sented themselves the courts have not been loath to apply the doctrine. Patent
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